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Over the past 20 years, a series of empirical studies in different countries have shown 
that the increase in genetic knowledge is leading to new forms of exclusion, 
disadvantaging and stigmatisation. The term “genetic discrimination” has been coined 
to refer to a (negative) differential treatment of an individual on the basis of what is 
known or assumed about his or her genetic makeup. Reported incidents2 include 
difficulties in finding or retaining employment, problems with insurance policies and 
difficulties with adoption.  
 
So far, no empirical data on genetic discrimination in Germany are available. For this 
reason it remains unclear how often people in Germany are discriminated against 
because of their genetic characteristics. Aside from individual cases do forms of 
systematic genetic discrimination exist? If so, in which institutions and social arenas 
do they appear? These questions cannot be answered at present even cursorily, since 
no specialised studies or basic surveys have been carried out. Even the ethical, legal, 
and social issues (ELSI) accompanying the Human Genome Project3 and financed by 
the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research does not include a single 
investigation of this.  
Introduction 
 
This absence of research on genetic discrimination in Germany is all the more 
surprising as the question of discrimination plays a key role in the public discussion of 
genetic diagnosis and its social impact. The problem of genetic discrimination is 
repeatedly highlighted in press reports and media coverage.4 For example, the case of 
a schoolteacher who was initially refused the status of probationary civil servant on 
the basis that she was at risk of suffering from a genetic illness attracted enormous 
media attention both in and outside Germany.5 The German National Ethics Council6 
dealt with the question of genetic discrimination in two of its opinions on predictive 
genetic testing, focusing on discrimination by employers and insurers. 
  
The consequences of genetic testing and the use of genetic information, both for 
individuals and for society, are at the heart of politicians’ regulatory efforts. After 
several years of debate the Human Genetic Examination Act (Gesetz über genetische 
Untersuchungen bei Menschen) was passed by the German parliament on August 27, 
2008 (it came into effect on February 1, 2010). The focus of the Act is on the right to 
information and self-determination with the aim of protecting individuals against 
abuse of their genetic information. The Act explicitly states (§4) that no person may 
be discriminated against or disadvantaged because of genetic characteristics. It 
generally prohibits insurers (§18) and employers (§19) from demanding a genetic 
examination or the results of any previously conducted medical genetic examination. 
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Insurers are only allowed to request the results of examinations in the case of life, 
disability or pension insurance policies exceeding EUR 300,000 or which provide an 
annuity exceeding EUR 30,000 per year.  
 
While genetic discrimination gives rise to heated exchanges in political and media 
debates in Germany, it still remains a non-issue in the academic literature. The present 
study is intended to draw attention to this gap in research, and to contribute toward 
closing it in part. It focuses on persons who are affected by (the risk of) Huntington’s 
Disease (HD) and their experiences of genetic discrimination. The presentation that 
follows is not a systematic investigation, however, but an explorative collection of 
case studies that could form the basis for a preliminary assessment of the specific 
domains and forms of genetic discrimination in Germany. 
 
The findings show that preceding studies on genetic discrimination in different 
countries have used the concept of genetic discrimination too narrowly, only referring 
to institutionalised discrimination. This study argues that it is necessary to take 
account of strategies individuals employ to manage and minimise the risk of genetic 
discrimination, and to widen the concept to include, first, mechanisms of indirect 
discrimination and second, discrimination in interpersonal interactions. These forms 
of genetic discrimination will be explained below by means of a description and 
discussion of the case studies. Initially, I will present the research approach adopted 
for the study and explain why the analysis concentrated on HD. The concluding 
section summarises the research findings and outlines some limits of the study.  
1. Methodology and research approach 
Huntington’s Disease 
Three considerations were decisive for the decision to approach persons suffering 
from (the risk of) HD for information about their experiences with genetic 
discrimination. The first concerns the etiology of the disease. HD is a late onset 
disease that usually first manifests itself in the 4th or 5th decade of a person’s life. The 
complaint generally entails severe physical and mental changes. The beginning of the 
disease is frequently marked by involuntary, sudden muscular twitching throughout 
the body or psychological disturbances and changes in personality; as the disease 
progresses the person’s physical and mental state deteriorates. Usually the symptoms 
progress until death after 10-15 years, but longer periods of illness have been known, 
some extending into very old age. HD is an autosomal-dominant hereditary disease, 
i.e., every child of a person bearing the mutation has a 50 per cent probability of 
receiving the allele7 in question. Since in the vast majority of cases HD does not 
manifest itself until late in life, the children of HD sufferers live with uncertainty at to 
whether or not they themselves bear the mutation and will suffer from the disease in 
the future.8 Although these “persons at risk”9 are not ill and may never fall prey to the 
disease, they are already exposed to discriminating practices, as studies10 in several 
countries have documented.  
 
The second reason for choosing HD in this study is that a predictive genetic test has 
existed for more than a decade which enables the mutation to be detected in blood or 
 
© ESRC Genomics Network.
18       Genomics, Society and Policy 
            2009, Vol.5, No.2 pp.22-39 
 
_____________    
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.2 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 
24
tissue samples.11 This “diagnostic invitation”12 offers “persons at risk” the 
opportunity to find out with relative certainty whether they bear the mutation.13 At the
same time, the abstract possibility that a person can verify his/her risk status may
third parties such as insurance companies or employers to exert significant pressure 
on the potentially affected person to inform himself or herself about their
 
 lead 
 risk.  
 
Third, there is evidence suggesting that “persons at risk” for HD have already 
experienced forms of genetic discrimination in Germany. While only a few cases have 
been reported in the media, it is recognised inside patient organisations and by those 
affected by the disease that many more cases exist.14  
 
In Germany, approximately 7,000-8,000 persons are directly affected by HD (the 
disease occurs with a frequency of 1-in-10,000 to 1-in-12,000), and the number of 
“persons at risk” who may fall ill at a later stage in their life is several times higher.15 
Although the genetic locus of the disease was identified some time ago, to date it has 
not proved possible to develop any effective therapy. Pharmacological and 
physiological treatment, cognitive training processes and supportive psycho-
therapeutic consultation may relieve the symptoms of the illness, but there has been 
no success in preventing the process of decline and the death of the patient.  
Study design 
All empirical studies on experiences of genetic discrimination confront a twofold 
problem: How can one find those affected and how can these individuals be persuaded 
to provide information on discriminatory practices? Some of the studies already 
conducted have worked with self-help groups, whose spectrum of members includes 
not only people suffering from the corresponding disorder but also “persons at risk” 
and their family members.16 This method was also selected for the present study, 
which was conducted in close cooperation with representatives from the Deutsche 
Huntington-Hilfe (DHH), the German Huntington’s Disease self-help organisation, 
which supports and coordinates the work of regional self-help groups in Germany. 
The group currently has some 1,500 members and makes contact with around another 
300 families every year. The DHH is organised into a national section, several 
regional sections and numerous local self-help groups. A Scientific Council 
comprising researchers in the field of HD serves as an advisory committee. Its 
function17 is to keep the group abreast of the latest findings with regard to the 
disease.18  
 
The concept of the study was submitted to the DHH Management Board and to the 
Advisory Council. Once both bodies had agreed to support the study, a questionnaire 
was published in the DHH quarterly Huntington-Kurier (2004 (2)). In an 
accompanying text the author introduced himself and his research activity and 
explained the study’s aims and approach. He also assured those prepared to take part 
that the information they provided would be used anonymously and in accordance 
with data protection regulations.19 The same issue of Huntington-Kurier carried a 
joint statement by the Management Board and the Advisory Council of the DHH, in 
which they encouraged readers to fill in the questionnaire and to participate in the 
study.  
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In order to increase the number of respondents, questionnaires were sent to 
approximately 30 contact groups in Germany and Austria. These groups usually meet 
on a monthly basis and serve to emotionally support those affected, to discuss 
practical problems, and to exchange information on social and medical questions and 
on the effects of the disease on family life. The questionnaires were sent to the 
organisers of the contact groups requesting them to hand them on to individuals 
willing to participate in the study.  
The questionnaire combined closed and open questions. The former referred to the 
person’s general health and risk status, while the latter asked for a description of 
possible instances of genetic discrimination. The questionnaire covered a broad 
spectrum of practices that might be seen as constituting discrimination. Whereas most 
investigations concentrate on discrimination on the part of institutions (such as 
insurance companies and employers), participants in this study could also make 
reference to discriminatory behaviour among their circle of friends and acquaintances, 
and even within their own family.  
 
The evaluation of the returned questionnaires sought to ascertain the possible extent 
and the specific forms of genetic discrimination. If signs of experience of genetic 
discrimination were present in the questionnaire, telephone interviews were conducted 
with the respondents (if they had granted permission beforehand). The goal of this 
supplementary questioning was to gain further and more detailed information on 
possible discriminatory practices. Altogether nine interviews lasting between 12 
minutes and more than an hour were conducted. Since not all respondents were 
willing to engage in a telephone interview, in five cases further written questions were 
sent to the informants by letter or email, but only one person responded to these. In 
addition, the project leader spoke to freelance insurance brokers and representatives of 
insurance companies. Information derived from discussions with human geneticists, 
medical experts in the field of HD and the DHH chair was also evaluated. Material 
gained from case observations and notes from conversations with those suffering from 
HD conducted at the 2004 DHH annual conference was also used. The written poll 
and telephone interviews were conducted between May and December 2004. 
Findings 
A total of 48 questionnaires were returned. Ten of these came from the contact group 
in Austria, one from the USA,20 and the rest from all parts of Germany. A clear 
majority of the informants (29 persons) declared that they had already experienced 
(genetic) discrimination and almost one-fifth feared they would experience it in the 
future (nine persons). About the same number (10 persons) answered both questions 
in the negative. “Persons at risk” for Huntington’s disease were in the minority among 
those who described their experiences of discrimination; most of the respondents were 
ill and reported practices of disrespect, stigmatisation, and exclusion based on already 
existing symptoms. 
 
Like several other studies, the findings of this investigation are based primarily on 
self-reported experiences of genetic discrimination. The study shows that some 
individuals are convinced that they have been discriminated against due to genetic 
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factors; however, the question of whether the reported discrimination concerns a 
practice without any legal foundation, or an “objectively justified” discrimination 
condoned by the legal system, is not considered. It is important to keep in mind that 
not every form of discrimination is morally reprehensible and/or legally prohibited. A 
company’s decision to only hire applicants with the best school marks is certainly 
unobjectionable, while in contrast, only accepting applications from men or from 
white people would not only spark protests but would in any case be illegal.21 The 
question then arises which differential treatment based on genetic characteristics can 
be considered socially acceptable or legitimate.  
 
However, it seems questionable whether a basis for an “objective appraisal” of genetic 
discrimination could be found by using such an approach, as some seem to suggest.22 
This goal is already doubtful since it omits a central feature of genetic discrimination. 
That which is perceived as discriminatory is itself subject to social judgments of value 
and normative conflicts. What one side might consider objectively justified and 
morally legitimate practice might be regarded as disrespectful and exclusionary by the 
other. A primary focus on the differentiation between “fair” and “unfair” 
discrimination threatens to omit a vital part of the discussion on practices of genetic 
discrimination.23  
2. Reports on institutional discrimination and strategies to avoid it 
 
In four cases “persons at risk” for HD reported genetic discrimination on the part of 
institutions. All these involved the insurance industry. A young woman, several 
members of whose family already suffer from HD, described an exemplary case. 
Case 1 
In 2002 the woman submitted an application for a “dread disease” insurance that 
covers serious diseases. The application form included questions on the state of the 
applicant’s health, in which possible “hereditary illnesses” were to be listed. The 
woman disclosed that she often had migraines and had poor eyesight, and also that her 
grandfather, father and uncle all suffered from HD or had already died from it.  
The insurance company initially rejected her application without explanation. In 
response to her inquiry by telephone, the insurance agent explained to her that the 
insurance coverage was denied to her because of the history of HD in her family. He 
regretted this decision, he said, but it was not possible for him to change it. The agent 
suggested that she take a genetic test. If the test result were negative, there would be 
no obstacle to an insurance contract. Shortly afterwards the woman received a letter 
from the insurance company rejecting her application and stating that “unfortunately 
we are bound to medical statistics in our decisions and thus forced to reject your 
application due to the family history of Huntington’s chorea”.24 This decision was – 
in the woman’s own words – “a slap in the face” [R 39; see also R 38, R 21, R 8]. 
 
This case (as well as the other three reported cases) is in line with the findings in the 
literature on genetic discrimination that focuses on institutional actors and 
organisational decisions. However, the picture remains incomplete. What is missing in 
these accounts is the plurality of strategies that individuals use to prevent themselves 
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from experiencing discrimination. The investigation carried out by Geller et al is an 
exception. However, only a small portion of that study is devoted to strategies to 
avoid genetic discrimination: “These strategies included purchasing insurance policies 
before genetic testing, being tested anonymously, paying out-of-pocket for tests so 
that insurance companies would not obtain the results, providing partial disclosure of 
relevant information and, sometimes, providing incorrect information.”25 The first 
study to address systematically the behavioural responses individuals develop to cope 
with the risk of genetic discrimination was undertaken by Bombard et al.26 The 
authors conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals who were found to 
have the mutation responsible for HD. Their findings suggested four main strategies 
used by individuals to manage the potential for or experiences of genetic 
discrimination: “keeping low”, minimizing, pre-empting and confronting genetic 
discrimination. 
The results of the author’s own investigation confirm the importance of this 
perspective. Respondents resorted to modes of action and patterns of behavior 
anticipating “a latent rejection” (R 47) and adapting their behaviour to real or 
imagined social constraints. One participant accounted for not having experienced 
genetic discrimination “because I do not mention my being a ‘person at risk’” (R 12). 
Another reports that she lives her life along the lines of: “The fewer people know, the 
better.” (R 21) The most effective means of pre-empting genetic discrimination is not 
to draw the (possible) mutation carrier status to the attention of institutional actors.  
 
This “precautionary secrecy” (R 47) can be seen in the way some individuals dealt 
with the question about “hereditary illnesses” asked at the official medical 
examinations conducted for those wishing to acquire the status of full civil servant in 
Germany. Some respondents provided incomplete or erroneous details in order to get 
the job they wanted (R 44; R 7). In the case of a female police officer the fear of her 
colleagues finding out about the disease led to her reading through the medical reports 
on her father, who was suffering from HD, to discover whether they contained 
anything indicating that she herself was at risk from the disease. She was afraid her 
superiors could force her to undergo predictive genetic testing in order to ascertain 
whether she was fit for service: “If somebody in the force had found out, I would not 
have been made a full civil servant! If it were to be made known now, I would 
probably be forced to take the test or to give up my job.” (R 19) Similar fears were 
mentioned by a woman who had held a temporary position at a university. She was 
certain that she would have lost her job and been “bullied out” if she had told anybody 
in the department about her risk of developing HD (R 40).  
 
Respondents concealed their family history both with regard to employment and in 
other institutional settings. One person gave inaccurate answers to questions about her 
family history when she applied for a private health insurance (R 7). In another case a 
man who, together with his wife, wished to adopt a child kept secret the fact that 
members of his family suffered from HD “because we were not sure whether that 
would have counted us out. We stated that my father had multiple sclerosis.” (R 46). 
 
This “information control as the management of genetic peculiarities”27 even extends 
to choice of partner, friends and neighbourly relations. Those confronted with a real or 
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imagined threat of genetic discrimination refuse to “come out” (R 40) and deliberately 
keep secret their risk of falling ill, fearing that otherwise their relationships with 
friends and acquaintances may change for the worse (R 44). In rare cases, even 
partners are not informed about the illness and symptoms involved (R 40). Many 
respondents conceive of this necessity not to disclose their genetic risk as a form of 
constraint which affects their personal and social relations in a negative way, limiting 
their communicative choices and forcing them to withhold from others important 
information about themselves and their own future. As one respondent put it, the fear 
of being “found out” is “a decisive factor that itself already represents a form of 
discrimination” (R 19).  
 
Concealing genetic risks seems to be characteristic even of the way those threatened 
by genetic discrimination relate to one another. One woman pointed out that among 
“persons at risk” the (positive) results of genetic tests are among the “best kept family 
secrets”. As she put it: “Among my circle of acquaintances it is actually only families 
who can be sure that no more of the offspring can contract Huntington’s that talk 
openly about the disease.” (R 24) The decision of those affected by the disease “not to 
let anything show” can also extend to their closest relatives; (grown-up) children may 
be excluded from discussions about the illness and their own risk status (R 47; R 40). 
A man suffering from HD broke off contact with the entire family of his brother, who 
was likewise suffering from the disease. Apparently he did not want his children to 
learn anything about the disease and its hereditary nature from their relatives (R 38; R 
39). 
 
The findings show that for a systematic analysis of genetic discrimination it is not 
sufficient simply to record cases of discrimination; it is also important to consider the 
strategies which the “persons at risk” or already affected individuals use to anticipate 
negative categorisation and the ways in which they adapt their behaviour accordingly. 
It is illuminating to consider this “precautionary secrecy” (R 47) about genetic risk 
status with Erving Goffman’s studies of stigmatised persons. Goffman differentiated 
between two forms of stigma: “does the stigmatized individual assume his 
differentness is known about already or is evident on the spot, or does he assume it is 
neither known about by those present nor immediately perceivable by them? In the 
first case one deals with the plight of the discredited, in the second with that of the 
discreditable.”28 Individuals with a genetic risk of falling ill are “discreditable” and 
the crucial problem for them is to filter and manage information about their “genetic 
defect” so that they do not end up as a discredited person.29 
3. “Hitler’s long shadow”: Mechanisms of indirect discrimination 
 
Empirical research on genetic discrimination has concentrated on the “negative” 
operational patterns: on coercive measures and asymmetric decision-making 
processes. Studies have focused mainly on organisations that reject qualifications or 
refuse to sign contracts. Our findings suggest that this is not sufficient. In addition to 
discrimination against individuals who are directly confronted with disadvantages or 
disrespect, the current study also revealed forms of “indirect” discrimination.30 
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Reproductive choice is a key arena in which indirect mechanisms of discrimination 
are experienced. Here the central question is whether or not persons who already 
suffer from HD, or may do so in the future, should have children as they might also be 
affected by the disease. As the reported experiences show, in Germany this question 
cannot be separated from the country’s history of eugenics. During the Nazi era in 
Germany, the “Law for the prevention of hereditary-ill offspring” led to the 
systematic registration of entire family branches of people with HD, obligatory 
reporting by physicians, forced sterilisation, and later the murder in extermination 
facilities of those affected by the disease.31 “Hitler’s long shadow” (R 7) is still cast 
over the present, since there are many patients with HD and “persons at risk” who lost 
their relatives as a result of the Nazi extermination policy. Only a few respondents 
actually fear that the eugenic ideas of the past will resurface in the future. But for one 
man who is already suffering from the disease, the way society deals with disabled 
people today is reminiscent of the practice of euthanasia under Nazi rule: “If the fact 
that disabilities can be filtered out is generally rooted in our minds, nobody will 
understand why there are still disabled people. In the past, Hitler already planned to 
eradicate disabilities by means of euthanasia and castration.” (R 3) That such worries 
are apparently not completely unfounded is demonstrated by the following case in 
which one physician emphasised the “model character” of National Socialist eugenics. 
Case 2 
A woman whose husband suffered from HD spoke to the hospital physician treating 
him about the implications of the disease. She reported that the female physician 
explained the significance of the disease in the following words: “This is a hereditary 
illness which unfortunately is incurable and has to be exterminated. Horrible tragedies 
took place in the past. One should not be allowed to have children, but only adopt 
them. The Nazis sterilised them all, and it was the best thing they did. Because the 
families were all stigmatised.” The physician advised the woman to annul her 
marriage and put her husband in a nursing home. For the wife this was “a terrible 
experience”, “a trauma”, and a “serious injury”. Shortly thereafter, the medical 
authorities turned down the man’s application for a stay at a health resort for 
rehabilitation purposes. The woman appealed against the decision and was informed 
by the person who had delivered the medical expertise: “What is someone like that 
going to do at a spa? This is far too expensive, and does not make sense.” [R 22]  
 
In contrast, some respondents expressed their belief that the current treatment of ill 
and disabled people has nothing to do with the eugenic practices of the Nazi regime 
(e.g. R 16). Whether they see a caesura or continuity, supporters and opponents of the 
theory that eugenic practices of the past also determine the societal future share a 
common assumption. In both accounts eugenics represents a politics that functions 
primarily via repression, and force.  
 
A different account is to be found in other answers. Here eugenics is interpreted less 
as a direct constraint that goes as far as physical destruction, and more as indirect 
guidance of individuals. In academic discourse, this is referred to as “individualist”32 
or “liberal eugenics”.33 This form of eugenics does not encompass the population at 
large, but aims to maximise individuals’ health and reduce their suffering. “Persons at 
 
© ESRC Genomics Network.
18       Genomics, Society and Policy 
            2009, Vol.5, No.2 pp.22-39 
 
_____________    
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.2 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 
30
risk” see themselves confronted with changed social norms and institutional 
expectations34 that are not embodied in explicit restrictions, but which foster and 
encourage a “mature”, “responsible” and “risk competent” attitude to health.35 Some 
respondents feared increasing pressure on possible mutation carriers to undergo 
predictive genetic testing in order to avoid health risks to oneself and one’s 
offspring.36 One respondent, for example, was worried “that ‘persons at risk’ could be 
forced to undergo diagnostics and that the possibility of prenatal testing reduces the 
level of acceptance of disabled people and restricts the development of effective 
medication and therapies” (R 17; similarly R 21). A number of respondents stated that 
given the risk of their falling ill and the hereditary nature of the disease they had made 
an explicit decision not to have any children of their own or had “not spoken about the 
topic” (R 47). From their point of view this decision was necessary, as it seemed 
irresponsible to them to have children who might suffer from HD (R 23; R 7).  
 
In two cases “persons at risk” reported that doctors had indicated to them that the 
decision to have children of their own was irresponsible and morally questionable. In 
one instance, after a male patient had been given a positive result in his HD test, the 
doctor stated categorically to him and his wife: “It is up to you to ensure that you have 
no more children and that the children you have already will have no children 
themselves.” The couple were then provided with the telephone number of the nearest 
genetic counselling service (R 45). In another case a woman at risk of developing HD 
described how a consultation when she was pregnant “had quite clearly tended 
towards an abortion” (R 44). Even though both these instances occurred 20 years ago, 
it is not clear that the principle of non-directiveness in genetic counselling is currently 
always treated with due respect. This is highlighted by the findings of a German study 
on the psychological and social aspects of predicting familial adenomatous polyposis 
(FAP)  –  an  inherited disorder characterised by cancer of the large intestine (colon) 
and rectum. A series of surveyed patients reported that their counselling physician 
attempted to exert influence on their family planning. For example, one of the 
surgeons said: “Please refrain from having children; otherwise you will only transmit 
the disorder.”37  
4. “Not acceptable”: Contradictory experiences of interactional discrimination  
 
Many “persons at risk” and those already suffering from HD criticised the general 
lack of knowledge about the genetic origin of the disease. According to them this was 
due, among other things, to the fact that the disorder occurs relatively rarely and is 
little known. Observers often ascribe the resulting motor ailments and speaking 
difficulties to drug abuse or alcohol problems. Those affected deplore these prejudices 
and the lack of understanding with which they are often confronted; people often 
“look at them disapprovingly”, see them as alcoholics (R 27; R 29), mock them (R 33; 
R 34) or even insult them (R 30). Interestingly, respondents reporting these incidents 
claim that they are genetically discriminated against. However, one might ask if this is 
truly the case since the observers obviously mistook those suffering from HD as being 
drug addicts or alcoholics and probably assumed that they were therefore responsible 
for their behaviour. This contrasts with the self-image of many individuals suffering 
from a congenital disease, who see themselves as not responsible at all for the 
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diseases they are suffering from – maybe even less than patients suffering from other 
diseases where a partial responsibility is sometimes ascribed (e.g. lung cancer in 
smokers). It follows that those respondents did not make a strict distinction between 
discrimination against disabled and sick people on the one hand and discrimination on 
the basis of the genotype on the other, but rather stressed the continuity of 
discriminatory practices. As one respondent put it, criticising the focus of the study on 
genetic discrimination as too narrow: “Why genetic discrimination? What is at stake 
is discrimination in general.” (R 5; italics in the original) 
 
It does not come as a surprise that many of those already suffering from HD 
experience the same problems sick and disabled people often face in their daily lives. 
Respondents deplored the fact that many people had “problems and difficulties” 
dealing with them (R 39); that having found out about the disease they subsequently 
avoided the person with HD (R 23), appeared confused and expressed a lack of 
understanding for their suffering and affliction (R 27), or responded “almost 
maliciously” when they encountered a person suffering from HD (R 40; R 47). 
Respondents registered increasing social isolation because friends and acquaintances 
often withdrew, broke off contact, and avoided people in whose families cases of HD 
had occurred (R 27; R 32; R 38; R 39; R 42; R 47).  
 
The experiences of disrespect and stigmatisation, as suggested above, extended to the 
families of those affected. Instead of reacting with sympathy and practical solidarity, 
contact with sick family members was often reduced or even completely broken off. 
In other cases, responsibility for HD was ascribed to the sick person and the physical 
and psychological suffering and limitations arising were denied (R 40). In one case, 
for example, the sister-in-law of a man suffering from HD accused him of 
“pretending” when he had to give up his profession due to the disorder. She alleged 
that she had to work so that he and her sister “could lead a comfortable life”. 
Disapproval also came from the husband’s family. Relatives made a taboo of the 
disease and its hereditary nature: “In his family no one spoke about Huntington’s 
disease. They regarded us as traitors since we said what [name] had” (R 22).38  
However, while some participants experienced disrespect and exclusion because they 
were held responsible for their disease or because they were not regarded as sick at all 
(but rather as drug addicts or alcoholics), others report that they were treated 
differently compared to other patients or people with disabilities. They felt confronted 
with an implicit hierarchy of diseases, HD representing an especially threatening kind. 
This issue is addressed in the case of a young woman who developed HD at a very 
early age and who held a voluntary position on a children’s ward until her superiors 
terminated her contract.  
Case 3 
At the beginning of 2003, the woman applied to the children’s charity of a German 
university hospital for a voluntary position as a social worker for sick children. The 
disease was still in its early stages, such that the woman was in no way mentally 
impaired, as a leading German HD expert confirmed in 2004. On taking up her 
position she informed her superior of the HD diagnosis. Since her superior was a 
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paraplegic and used a wheelchair (she also recalled that he suffered from occasional 
cramps), she had no fear of speaking openly with him about her own disease.  
 
The relationship with her superior, however, quickly deteriorated. He indicated to her 
that she was “overtaxed” and after some time forbade her to be alone with the children 
in a room (other social workers were allowed this). This measure resulted, among 
other drawbacks, in her not being able to work when her colleagues were on holiday. 
Since she found this to be an unfair restriction, she asked for a meeting with her 
superior. During their discussion he explained that he could not assume 
“responsibility” in case something happened to the children. He claimed that because 
of her disease it could not be ruled out that she could drop a child or would not be able 
to run after a child.  
 
Annoyed that she was being treated differently from other voluntary helpers, the 
woman appealed to the head of the institution. The director explained to her that the 
superior had acted correctly, since she was supposedly “psychologically unstable”. 
The director told the respondent that she was a “danger” for the children since it was 
unclear how she would behave in the future. As a person affected with HD, she was 
“unpredictable” and thus “not acceptable” in the hospital. The young woman offered 
to present medical reports to corroborate that she was physically and mentally 
completely capable of taking care of children. The director, however, rejected the 
suggestion and terminated the contract [R 23]. 
 
The justification offered for the woman’s lack of capability or even the “danger” 
posed by her is all the more surprising since her superior, who without a doubt was 
physically restricted, took care of the children alone without having a second person 
present. Moreover, the voluntary colleagues of the young woman were in the majority 
retirees, many over 70 years old, who openly admitted to the respondent often feeling 
overtaxed by the children. Since at the time she worked in the hospital the woman did 
not suffer from any marked physical or mental limitations, questions arise concerning 
the grounds for her rejection by the hospital’s management. On the one hand, it may 
be that ignorance about the disease itself, its highly complex causes and specific 
symptoms, was responsible for the woman being treated differently. On the other 
hand her superiors’ fear could well be rooted in the specific genetic nature of the 
disease, which in their own words they regarded as “unpredictable” and “dangerous”, 
to the extent that they forbade the young woman to be alone with the children. 
 
In the following case, the care workers in a secure psychiatric hospital had similar 
fears of a man suffering from HD who had been admitted following a series of suicide 
attempts. 
Case 4  
According to his daughter, despite suffering severely from dysfunctions in physical 
coordination the patient in question was not aggressive and mentally “very alert”. As 
the woman recalled, the hospital staff had had no experience with HD and displayed 
no interest in finding out about it. Because of the uncoordinated manner in which the 
patient moved, the care workers refused to cut his fingernails. These grew to such a 
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length that the man injured his face. He was also insulted by several care workers 
(“Here comes our dancer, wait until he falls on his face and starts to cry again”). 
When the daughter pointed out to the responsible physician the improper behaviour of 
the personnel, she was told that the care workers were “afraid” of her father, 
supposedly since his “disease is so strange”. According to the doctor, they feared the 
patient would lash out at them (“getting a clip round the ears”) [R 19]. 
 
These reports seem to indicate that some of those suffering from HD encounter 
specific fears that could possibly be linked to the genetic nature of the disease. 
However, it should be noted that HD is a degenerative neurological disease with 
extraordinary symptoms: it is different from many genetic illnesses that manifest 
themselves “only” in physical restrictions and limited capabilities. It is possible that 
the experiences with disrespect and disadvantage described here are the result of a 
fear of actual or imaginary behavioural and personality changes of the patients. In this 
context, further studies might focus on whether those with non-genetic degenerative 
neurological illnesses are subjected to similar treatment or whether there are 
significant differences between the two groups.  
 
Those who suffer from genetic discrimination perceive it as particularly disrespectful 
and disparaging, because genetic factors are considered to be especially effective and 
extremely important in everyday discourse. Genetic information not only seems to be 
suited to revealing hidden truths about individual health risks and physical or mental 
characteristics, it has also been noted that family and kinship relations are increasingly 
shaped by a “genetic inheritance ideology”39. As Armstrong, Michie and Marteau40 
demonstrate in their analysis of genetic consultations, those affected by genetic 
diseases differ from other sick persons in one fundamental area: “Being diagnosed as 
having a disease or having a spoiling surgical procedure [...] means a new identity, 
one that is added to or conflicts with an existing identity. In genetic disease there may 
still be stigma, both felt in terms of feeling ‘spoiled’ and enacted (for example, from 
insurance companies), but it has a different basis. Genetic disease differs in as much 
as it promises to reveal who the individual always has been, not a new addition but a 
revelation about an underlying identity that had been concealed.”41 
 
From a cultural point of view, genes are often seen to symbolise something fateful and 
unalterable.42 Genetic risks43 are seen as being unique in that they neither enter the 
body from without nor do they destroy the body’s defence mechanisms from within. 
They are part and parcel of the individual’s genetic constitution and not – as with 
other health risks – a temporary risk that can be treated and eradicated.44 The 
exaggerated significance of genetic factors in the media and everyday discourse is the 
reason for a specific feeling of threat and fear. He or she not only “carries” or 




The findings of this study reveal the limits of a narrow concept of genetic 
discrimination. Previous studies tended to focus on institutional actors such as 
 
© ESRC Genomics Network.
18       Genomics, Society and Policy 
            2009, Vol.5, No.2 pp.22-39 
 
_____________    
 
Genomics, Society and Policy, Vol.5, No.2 (2009) ISSN: 1746-5354 
34
insurance companies, employers, adoption agencies etc., thereby excluding important 
fields of genetic discrimination. First, they did not take into account the plurality and 
diversity of strategies that “persons at risk” use to preempt genetic discrimination. As 
the findings of this study suggest, it is not sufficient just to focus on “cases” of genetic 
discrimination. Studies should also investigate what strategies individuals employ to 
counter what they conceive of as a threat to their private and professional life. 
Second, since studies of genetic discrimination have so far concentrated on 
mechanisms of institutional discrimination, they were only sensitive to cases where 
particular individuals were directly confronted with disadvantages and disrespect. 
Verdicts of social unworthiness, prejudice structures and stereotypes that often 
provide the normative basis for institutional decision-making and discriminatory 
practices have been left outside the analytic frame. This “indirect” discrimination 
includes all those factors that limit the choices and options available to “persons at 
risk”.46  
 
Third, these findings suggest that it might be useful to distinguish between two levels 
of genetic discrimination: one that is based on personal interaction, and another that 
builds on institutional settings.47 The former includes more or less spontaneous 
stigmatising or disrespectful words or acts (individual or collective) against other 
persons, while the latter focuses on durable organisational structures. While these two 
levels can only be distinguished analytically and in reality often overlap, they make it 
possible to investigate the conflicting and contradictory experiences of discrimination 
suffered by those affected by HD. While some are taken to be alcoholics or drug 
addicts and as such not regarded as sick at all, others are addressed as patients 
deserving some kind of special treatment since they represent a particular danger to 
themselves and others. 
 
Two implications for further research result from these findings. One the one hand, it 
is necessary to ask whether genetic discrimination can be empirically shown to 
represent a form of discrimination sui generis that needs to be regarded separately 
from discrimination experienced by other disabled or chronically ill persons. On the 
other hand, there is a need to develop a theoretically informed notion of genetic 
discrimination and to investigate how it differs from related notions like 
“stigmatisation”, “geneticization”48 or “geneticism”.49  
 
However, given the low response rate and considering the fact that there are 
approximately 8,000 people in Germany suffering from HD and many more “persons 
at risk”, it is obvious that this study cannot be a representative survey. In addition, one 
must take into account that given the high penetrance of the disorder and the 
exceptional predictive value of the genetic test, HD occupies a special position within 
the spectrum of genetic diseases. Persons with other genetic peculiarities may be 
confronted with forms of genetic discrimination which are significantly different from 
those analysed here. The results of this exploratory study only allow cautious 
conclusions to be drawn about experiences of genetic discrimination. Future studies 
will have to determine more precisely, and in greater detail, the quantitative extent 
and the qualitative significance of practices of genetic discrimination in Germany. 
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